SPECIAL REPORT-AUTOMATED ELECTION-Eight of a Series- May 11, 2010
SPECIAL REPORT-AUTOMATED ELECTION
Eight of a Series- May 11, 2010
By Ike Seneres
It took me two hours to vote yesterday. One blogger wrote that in his precinct in Alabang, it took him almost nine hours to vote. Many prospective voters gave up and went home. The duration to vote appeared to be slow in some areas and fast in some, indicating that the experience was varied in many places. Hopefully, the COMELEC will issue an honest report about the average duration in most areas, because that is what the bottom line is all about.
Amidst all the reports about Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines breaking down and not working everywhere, the COMELEC says that only about 308 machines did not function, in effect claiming that less than 5% of the machines malfunctioned. This is what I mean by expecting them for an honest report, because the data coming from the field seems to contradict their claims.
Now that the voting is over, one very important question is the actual accuracy rate of the counting. According to the Terms of Reference of the COMELEC bidding, the error rate should not exceed 1%. As of last night, the COMELEC said that the error rate could go beyond this requirement. It is too early to conclude about the actual statistics however, since the voting is not yet really over.
Realizing that many voters would be unable to vote by the end of voting hours at 6:00 PM last night, the COMELEC decided to extend the voting by another hour. Despite clarifications that all those already in the perimeter of the precincts would still be allowed to vote no matter how long it takes, there were many reports that many were unable to vote, raising the issue of massive disenfranchisement.
The admission of the COMELEC that the malfunction rate is about 5% and their related admission that the error rate could go beyond what is allowable leaves open the question of how many voters were really disenfranchised. The answer to this question will become clear after we will receive the reports of third party sources. By then, we would be able to compare the two data sets. In the interest of transparency, it would be good for the COMELEC to allow third parties to do their own validation.
By force of circumstance, it would appear that the COMELEC ended up implementing a hybrid system of counting, combining both the manual and optical methods. Although some would say that there is no legal basis for manual counting, the argument is very strong that it is within the power of the COMELEC to partially use this method, for practical reasons.
Since the COMELEC prepared only for the optical method, it appears that they were not able to put together the facsimile signatures of the member of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). Without these facsimile signatures, there is going to be no legal basis to authenticate the signatures of these members, and because of that, some enterprising lawyers of losing candidates could question the validity of the documents. To add to this issue, it appears that the COMELEC was also unable to print the paper versions of the forms for Election Returns (ER) and Certificates of Canvass (COC).
The situation appears to be the same in the case of digital signatures. As far as I know, the COMELEC was also unable to prepare a database of digital signatures. The last I heard is that SMARTMATIC was supposed to function as the Certification Authority (CA). If this pushed through, there could still be a problem of conflict of interest, because a CA is supposed to be an independent entity other than the project contractor.
Up until yesterday, the COMELEC still has not answered the question of the identity of their Project Manager, so that the background or track record of this person could be vetted by his peers. The COMELEC has also not disclosed the location and ownership of the data center that will host the server, and the security features of this overall set-up.
Also up until yesterday, there were no negative reports about failures in the transmission, canvassing and consolidation stages. That is good news, and I hope that the positive trend will continue, because there were earlier apprehensions that glitches could happen since these three stages were put into operation without the necessary testing. Some issues were also raised about the validity and authenticity of the ballots since it was widely observed that many of the BEI members did not bother to use the ultraviolet (UV) lamps that were purchased to check whether the ballots were authentic or not. This is not a reliable check, but that is another issue altogether.
Check out the complete series at www.senseneres.blogspot.com
Eight of a Series- May 11, 2010
By Ike Seneres
It took me two hours to vote yesterday. One blogger wrote that in his precinct in Alabang, it took him almost nine hours to vote. Many prospective voters gave up and went home. The duration to vote appeared to be slow in some areas and fast in some, indicating that the experience was varied in many places. Hopefully, the COMELEC will issue an honest report about the average duration in most areas, because that is what the bottom line is all about.
Amidst all the reports about Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines breaking down and not working everywhere, the COMELEC says that only about 308 machines did not function, in effect claiming that less than 5% of the machines malfunctioned. This is what I mean by expecting them for an honest report, because the data coming from the field seems to contradict their claims.
Now that the voting is over, one very important question is the actual accuracy rate of the counting. According to the Terms of Reference of the COMELEC bidding, the error rate should not exceed 1%. As of last night, the COMELEC said that the error rate could go beyond this requirement. It is too early to conclude about the actual statistics however, since the voting is not yet really over.
Realizing that many voters would be unable to vote by the end of voting hours at 6:00 PM last night, the COMELEC decided to extend the voting by another hour. Despite clarifications that all those already in the perimeter of the precincts would still be allowed to vote no matter how long it takes, there were many reports that many were unable to vote, raising the issue of massive disenfranchisement.
The admission of the COMELEC that the malfunction rate is about 5% and their related admission that the error rate could go beyond what is allowable leaves open the question of how many voters were really disenfranchised. The answer to this question will become clear after we will receive the reports of third party sources. By then, we would be able to compare the two data sets. In the interest of transparency, it would be good for the COMELEC to allow third parties to do their own validation.
By force of circumstance, it would appear that the COMELEC ended up implementing a hybrid system of counting, combining both the manual and optical methods. Although some would say that there is no legal basis for manual counting, the argument is very strong that it is within the power of the COMELEC to partially use this method, for practical reasons.
Since the COMELEC prepared only for the optical method, it appears that they were not able to put together the facsimile signatures of the member of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). Without these facsimile signatures, there is going to be no legal basis to authenticate the signatures of these members, and because of that, some enterprising lawyers of losing candidates could question the validity of the documents. To add to this issue, it appears that the COMELEC was also unable to print the paper versions of the forms for Election Returns (ER) and Certificates of Canvass (COC).
The situation appears to be the same in the case of digital signatures. As far as I know, the COMELEC was also unable to prepare a database of digital signatures. The last I heard is that SMARTMATIC was supposed to function as the Certification Authority (CA). If this pushed through, there could still be a problem of conflict of interest, because a CA is supposed to be an independent entity other than the project contractor.
Up until yesterday, the COMELEC still has not answered the question of the identity of their Project Manager, so that the background or track record of this person could be vetted by his peers. The COMELEC has also not disclosed the location and ownership of the data center that will host the server, and the security features of this overall set-up.
Also up until yesterday, there were no negative reports about failures in the transmission, canvassing and consolidation stages. That is good news, and I hope that the positive trend will continue, because there were earlier apprehensions that glitches could happen since these three stages were put into operation without the necessary testing. Some issues were also raised about the validity and authenticity of the ballots since it was widely observed that many of the BEI members did not bother to use the ultraviolet (UV) lamps that were purchased to check whether the ballots were authentic or not. This is not a reliable check, but that is another issue altogether.
Check out the complete series at www.senseneres.blogspot.com
posted by Ike Señeres at 10:07 AM
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